We propose a model of cycles of distrust and con ‡ict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be mistakenly perceived as bad/distrusting actions. We also assume that there is limited information about the history of past actions, so that an agent is unable to ascertain exactly when and how a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, snowballs of distrust and con ‡ict get started as a result of a mistaken perception, and continue because the other side interprets the bad action as evidence that it is facing extremists. However, such snowballs of distrust and con ‡ict contain the seeds of their own dissolution: after a while, Bayesian agents correctly conclude that the probability of a snowball having started by mistake is su¢ ciently high, and bad actions are no longer interpreted as evidence of extremism. At this point, one party experiments with a good action, and the cycle restarts. We show how this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic con ‡ict and international war, and how it also emerges in models of dynamic inter-group trade, communication and political participation-leading to cycles of breakdown of trade, breakdown of communication, and political polarization.
Introduction
Mutual bene…ts from trust, cooperation, and communication not withstanding, inter-group con ‡ict is pervasive. In his study of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (2000) traces the origins of con ‡ict as much to fear and distrust as to other factors such as greed and honor. He argues that the Peloponnesian War became inevitable precisely because each side saw war as inevitable and did not want to relinquish the …rst mover advantage to the other (see also Kagan, 2004) . 1 This view of con ‡ict, sometimes also referred as the Hobbesian view, has a clear dynamic implication: if Group A's actions look aggressive, Group B infers that Group A is likely to be aggressive and acts aggressively itself (e.g., Jervis, 1976 , Kydd, 1997) . Moreover, unless Group A can fully understand that Group B is acting aggressively in response to its own actions, it will take this response as evidence that Group B is aggressive. As a result, con ‡ict snowballs.
The ubiquity of "con ‡ict snowballs"throughout history provides prima facie support for this view.
A leading example is ethnic con ‡ict: Donald L. Horowitz argues that "The fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end" (Horowitz, 2000, p.
187), and suggests that such fear of ethnic domination was the primary cause of the rise in ethnic violence following the withdrawal of colonial powers. 2 More recent examples of such snowballs are provided by con ‡icts in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza and the West Bank, and Turkey. For instance, many accounts of the dynamics of the Serbian-Croatian war emphasize Croatian fears from the aggressive posturing of Milosevic, which were instrumental in triggering more aggressive Croatian actions, including the adoption as the national symbol of the sahovnica, associated with the fascist pre-Yugoslavia Ustasha regime, and a variety of discriminatory policies towards the Serbian minority (e.g., Posen, 1993) . These actions then snowballed into all-out war. 3 World War I is also often attributed to such a con ‡ict snowball, or as 1 The fear motive for con ‡ict is also referred to as the "Hobbesian trap"or the "security dilemma"(following Schelling, 1960) . It is modeled by, among others, Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) and Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2010). 2 Horowitz also writes: "In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the greatest group anxiety was to avoid creating an old colonialism for a new one..." (p. 188), and quotes from James S. Coleman's (1958) study of ethnic con ‡ict in Nigeria that "in a self-governing Nigeria the north would in e¤ect be a backward protectorate governed by Southerners... The threat of sudden domination, fancied or real, was the major stimulant in the northern awakening." Robert N. Kearney (1967) describes the intensi…cation of ethnic con ‡ict in Sri Lanka (Ceylon): "The gradual transfer of power from foreign to Ceylonese hands quickly created concern for the relative political strength of the various communities. The basic assumption upon which this concern rested was that the share of political power held by members of one community would be used for the exclusive bene…t of that community or to the detriment of other communities."
3 DellaVigna et al. (2011) provide further evidence highly suggestive of a con ‡ict snowball in this context. They show that Croatians who received nationalistic radio broadcasts from the Serbian side were more nationalistic and more supportive of anti-Serbian actions. Kaplan et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent with a "cycle of violence" from the Israeli-Palestinian con ‡ict (but see also Jaeger and Paserman, 2008) .
Morganthau puts it (1967, p. 185), "the First World War had its origins exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power" (for example, because defensive alliances like the Triple Alliance were viewed as hostile by those left outside). He continues (p. 186): "It was this fear that motivated Austria in July 1914 to try to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and that induced Germany to support Austria unconditionally. It was the same fear that brought Russia to the support of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia," (see also Ferguson, 2000) . Snowball e¤ects might account not only for violent con ‡ict between nations and ethnic groups, but also for lack of trust and communication between groups and within organizations. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) document deep-rooted distrust among some nations, and show that it is associated with lower international trade and foreign direct investment, and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2011) show a similar pattern of international business ventures. Kramer (1999) surveys a large social psychology literature documenting the emergence and persistence of distrust within organizations. In most cases, distrust is triggered by suspicion that others are untrustworthy or are pursuing ulterior motives. Some see the root cause of the increasing polarization in US politics also in this type of snowball e¤ects which may have made each side segregate into their own "echo-chambers" where they only listen to like-minded communication (e.g., Sunstein, 2006) . 4 This classical view of con ‡ict and distrust is incomplete, however, because it only explains how con ‡ict starts and not how it stops-even though most con ‡ict snowballs come to an end sooner or later. For example, sectarian con ‡ict in Northern Ireland has ended; the widespread distrust and con ‡ict between blacks and white in South Africa has largely subsided; Serbia and Croatia now have peaceful relations; and the historical Franco-German distrust and animosity has made way to vibrant trade and economic and diplomatic cooperation. The bloody ethnic wars that seemed intractable after the end of World War II have dramatically abated over the past two decades. Even if political polarization in the US seems incorrigible today, a similar era of polarization in the …rst third of the 20th century was followed by a long period of non-partisan politics (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2008) . So rather than in…nite con ‡ict snowballs-where con ‡ict once initiated never subsides-history for the most part looks like a series of con ‡ict cycles, where even long periods of con ‡ict eventually end, often quite suddenly and unexpectedly. This paper proposes a simple model of con ‡ict snowballs, and then shows that such snowballs contain the seeds of their own dissolution-thus accounting not only for the onset but also the end of con ‡ict. The basic idea of our approach is simple: once Group A and B get into a phase in which they are both acting aggressively, the likelihood that a con ‡ict snowball has been triggered by mistake at some point increases over time. This implies that aggressive actions-which are typically informative about how aggressive the other side is-eventually become uninformative. Once this happens, one group will …nd it bene…cial to experiment with cooperation, and, unless the other group is truly aggressive, cooperation will resume-until the next con ‡ict snowball begins.
Our model features a coordination game between overlapping generations of (representatives of) 4 See McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2008) and Abramowitz (2011) on polarization of US politics. two groups. The "bad"action in the coordination game may correspond to …ghting or initiating other types of con ‡icts, and is a best response to bad actions from the other party, while the "good"action is optimal when good actions are expected. Each side is uncertain about the type of their opponents, who may be-with small probability-committed to the bad action. The two distinguishing features of our approach are: (1) noisy Bayesian updating, so that individuals (groups) understand that con ‡ict may be initiated because of a misunderstanding or unintended action; and (2) limited information about the exact sequence of events in the past, so that when and for what reason con ‡ict has started is unknown.
These features together generate a distinctive pattern where, in the unique sequential equilibrium of this dynamic game, a snowball of distrust and con ‡ict is sometimes initiated and persists, but must also endogenously come to an end. The onset of a con ‡ict snowball is often due to a misperceived aggression from the other side. The …rst contribution of our model is to show that because of limited information about the past, the next generation, seeing only the con ‡ict and not how it came about, often responds by choosing a bad action, perpetuating the snowball. 5 The main contribution of our model is to show that such snowballs of con ‡ict will eventually cease: when an individual or group reasons that there have been "enough" chances for a con ‡ict snowball to have gotten started (call this number T ), they will conclude that the likelihood that it started by mistake-rather than being started intentionally by a truly aggressive adversary-is su¢ ciently high, and they will experiment with the good action. In our baseline model, these two forces lead to a unique equilibrium which features a mixture of deterministic and stochastic cycles. In particular, a single misperceived action stochastically initiates a con ‡ict snowball, which then concludes deterministically at the next time t that is a multiple of T .
The rest of the paper argues that the forces we isolate in this simple dynamic game are relevant for thinking about cycles of distrust in a variety of situations. First, in subsection 2.3 we argue that our baseline game is a natural model of ethnic or international war. In addition to capturing the essence of the Hobbesian view of con ‡ict, ours is a direct overlapping generations analog of the models used by Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) and Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2010) to study related issues in a static setting. Our model implies that the unique equilibrium in the context of ethnic and international con ‡ict may involve cycles of distrust fueling cycles of con ‡ict-so that neither war nor peace is an absorbing state. 6 Though similar forces are important for understanding other instances of the cycle of distrust, these applications typically necessitate somewhat di¤erent and more detailed assumptions than in 5 While informal accounts of con ‡ict often invoke snowballs (e.g., Posen 1993), they do not clarify the conditions under which they will emerge. For example, full observation of the history of signals and actions would preclude snowballs for the following reason: if Group A knows that Group B perceived her initial action as aggressive and responded aggressively, then Group A should not respond aggressively in turn (as she knows that Group B would have behaved this way even if he were not inherently aggressive). In our model, limited information about past signals, as well as about when con ‡ict started, prevents this type of perfect inference and makes snowballs possible. 6 Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011) develop a related dynamic "Hobbesian"model of con ‡ict, in which war signals that one group does not value trade with the other and thus leads to the breakdown of trade. Their model does not feature cycles of con ‡ict or distrust. our baseline model. We therefore complement the baseline model with three more detailed models of the cycle of distrust, each tailored to a particular application and arranged in order of increasing complexity: trade, communication, and political partisanship. We study cycles of trade breakdown in Section 3. We posit that some groups are unable to produce high-quality goods, while others can produce them at a cost, and each agent decides whether to produce a high-quality good and whether to trade in both periods of her life. The coordination game-like features emerge because this cost is only worth paying when the other group will also produce high-quality goods, making exchange worthwhile. We show that the equilibrium is essentially unique, and features a cyclical pattern similar to the baseline model.
In Section 4, we study cycles of "miscommunication" using a similar setup consisting of two groups with di¤erent political views and overlapping generations of players. Each group may be extremist and thus stubbornly repeat their own views, while normal groups are willing to moderate their communication in order to in ‡uence the other party. This model yields a cycle where phases of informative communication alternate with phases of uninformative, "ideological," communication.
This may be viewed as a dynamic model of social learning, where ideological extremism-or merely the fear that the other side is extreme-can prevent information aggregation. 7 Finally, in Section 5 we study the dynamics of political partisanship and participation using a model where extreme politicians care primarily about a partisan political issue, while normal politicians care primarily about a common-interest issue. A cycle of partisanship emerges, where politicians act on the partisan issue when they think the other party is extremist, and act on the major issue when they think the other party is moderate. Augmenting this model with a model of voter turnout, we predict a cycle of voter turnout that mirrors the cycle of partisanship: turnout and propaganda are both high in the partisan phase of the cycle, while turnout is low and communication between the parties is informative in the cooperative phase. This model may capture aspects of the cycle of political partisanship documented by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2008), Abramowitz (2011) , and others. 8 Section 6 presents "technical"extensions of the baseline model, which show that our basic insights are robust to relaxing a variety of convenient assumptions we make in the main analysis. These include allowing two-sided errors, so that bad actions can also be perceived as good actions, and allowing more information about past actions. 7 In this respect, it generalizes Morris (2001) as well as Prendergast (1993) , Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004) , and Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2011). Relatedly, Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Sethi and Yildiz (2009) present models where social learning is precluded because of heterogeneous and unknown biases among members of society.
8 Notably, our model generates such cycles even though the electorate itself does not become more polarized, which is consistent with the evidence presented in Fiorina (2011) .
Other related work includes Bernhardt, Krasa, and Polborn (2008), Chan and Suen (2008) , and Gul and Pesendorfer (2011) , who present models linking polarization to competition among media outlets. One interpretation of "cooperation" in our model is that the cooperative action is engaging in an informative political dialogue that gives the other party the information it needs to set policy, while the uncooperative action is broadcasting propaganda to one's base to try to maximize turnout. On this interpretation, our model complements these papers by studying the incentives for political parties themselves to provide useful information rather than propaganda.
Our paper also relates to several strands of the literature on dynamic games, including anti-folk theorems in overlapping generations games (e.g., Laguno¤ and Matsui, 1997) and reputation with limited records (e.g., Liu and Skrzypacz, 2011) . We discuss the relationship of our paper to these and other literatures in Section 7. Section 8 concludes, while the Appendix contains proofs omitted from the text.
Baseline Model: Trust Game
In this section, we present our baseline model, which formalizes in the simplest possible way how con ‡ict snowballs can form but cannot last forever when individuals are Bayesian and have limited information about the history of con ‡ict. The ideas developed in this section are the basis for the more detailed applications considered in the rest of the paper. At the end of this section, we present our …rst application, ethnic con ‡ict and international war, which uses the baseline model.
Model and Equilibrium Characterization
Two groups, Group A and Group B, interact over time t = 0; 1; 2; : : :. At every time t, there is one active player ("player t") who takes a pair of actions (x t ; y t ) 2 f0; 1g f0; 1g, where x t = 1 and y t = 1 are "good"or "honest"actions and x t = 0 and y t = 0 are "bad"or "cheating"actions; as will become clear, x t is player t's action toward player t 1, and y t is player t's action toward player t + 1. In even periods the active player is a member of Group A, and in odd periods the active player is a member of Group B. A di¤erent player is active every period. A key assumption is that players observe very little about what happened in past periods: in particular, before player t takes her action, she observes only a signalỹ t 1 2 f0; 1g of player t 1's action toward her. This assumption captures the feature that agents may know that there is currently con ‡ict or cheating without fully knowing how this was initiated in the past. We assume thatỹ t 1 is determined as:
where 2 (0; 1). Thus, a good action sometimes leads to a bad signal, but a bad action never leads to a good signal. 9 Each group consists either entirely of normal types or entirely of bad types. The probability that a group is bad (i.e., consists of bad types) is 0 > 0. Playing (x t = 0; y t = 0) is a dominant strategy for the bad type of player t. For t > 0, the normal type of player t has utility function u (x t ;ỹ t 1 ) + u (y t ; x t+1 ) , 9 We relax this assumption as well as the assumption that nothing of the past history beyond last period's con ‡ict is observed in Section 6. so her payo¤ is the sum of her payo¤ against player t 1 and her payo¤ against player t + 1. 10 The normal type of player 0 has utility function u (y 0 ; x 1 ). 11 We assume that each "subgame" between neighboring players is a coordination game, and that (1; 1) is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium:
Thus, the good action is a best-response to the good signal or to the expectation of the good action, and the bad action is a best-response to the bad signal or to the expectation of the bad action.
We make the following joint assumption on u, , and 0 , which holds if and 0 are small (since the term in parentheses is between 0 and 1 by Assumption 1):
Assumption 2 is equivalent to assuming that normal player 0, with belief 0 , plays y 0 = 1 when she believes that player 1 plays x 1 = 1 if and only if he is normal and sees signalỹ 0 = 1.
We can now explain the logic of the model. Assumption 1 ensures that in any sequential equilibrium player t does indeed play x t = 1 if and only if he is normal and sees signalỹ 0 = 1. In view of this, Assumption 2 implies that normal player 0's prior about the other group is su¢ ciently favorable that she starts out with y 0 = 1.
Next, consider the problem of normal player 1. If he sees signal 1, then he knows the other group is normal-since bad types take the bad action which never generates the good signal. In this case, his belief about the other group is even better than player 0's, so he plays y 1 = 1 (in addition to playing x 1 = 1). But what if he sees signal 0? He clearly plays x 1 = 0, but moreover, by Bayes rule, his posterior belief that the other group is bad rises to
Now if 1 is su¢ ciently high-in particular, if it is above the cuto¤ belief -then player 1 plays y 1 = 0 after she sees signal 0. 12 Now suppose that up until time t normal players play y t = 0 after seeing signal 0, and consider the problem of normal player t. Again, if she sees signal 1, she knows the other group is normal and plays 1 0 This additive and undiscounted form of player t's utility function is adopted for simplicity, and can be relaxed. 1 1 Note that this makes action x0 irrelevant, so it we ignore it (equivalently, assume that player 0 only chooses y0 2 f0; 1g). 1 2 To be clear, we do not assume that 1 > . But if 1 < , then the con ‡ict "cycle" that emerges is the trivial cycle where cooperation always restarts immediately after a misperception.
(x t = 1; y 1 = 1). But if she sees signal 0, she knows that this could be due to a bad signal arriving at any time before t, because a single bad signal starts a snowball of bad actions. Thus, her posterior is
If t is above the cuto¤ belief , then player t again plays y t = 0 after seeing signal 0. But note that t is decreasing in t, that t ! 0 as t ! 1, and that 0 < . Thus, there is some …rst time T -given by (1) in the Appendix-at which T . And at this time, player T plays y T = 1 even if she sees signal 0. Thus, any snowball of bad actions that started before time T ends at T .
Finally, consider the problem of normal player T + 1. He knows that player T plays y T = 1 if and only if she is normal. Thus, player T + 1 is in exactly the same situation as player 1, and play from period T + 1 on is therefore exactly like play from period 1 on. Hence, play is characterized by cycles of length T , in which a single bad signal starts at some time t starts a snowball of bad actions that lasts until the next multiple of T .
A central feature of the above argument is that it holds regardless of beliefs about future play.
Consequently, equilibrium is unique up to one technicality: if T exactly equals , then cycles can be of length either T or T + 1, and this can eventually lead to "restarts" of cooperation occurring at a wide range of times. To avoid this possibility, we make the following genericity assumption on the parameters:
We now state our main result for the baseline model, establishing that there is a unique equilibrium which is cyclic. The same cyclic equilibrium structure will arise in all of the more detailed applications studied later in the paper.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, the baseline model has a unique sequential equilibrium. It has the following properties:
1. At every time t 6 = 0 mod T , normal player t plays good actions (x t = 1; y t = 1) if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, and plays bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0) if she gets the bad signalỹ t 1 = 0.
2. At every time t = 0 mod T , normal player t plays the good action x t = 1 toward player t 1 if and only if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, but plays the good action y t = 1 toward player t + 1 regardless of her signal.
3. Bad players always play bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0).
It is straightforward to turn the above discussion into a proof of Proposition 1, and we omit this formal proof. 13 1 3 The proof is similar to-but simpler than-the proof of Propostion 4, which is in the Appendix. Figures 1 and 2 graph the probability of observing con ‡ict (i.e., the bad signal) when both groups are normal, 1 (1 ) t mod T , as well as a normal player's posterior assessment of the probability that the other group is bad after observing con ‡ict, t mod T , for parameter values 0 = 1=9, = 1=10, and (u (0; 0) u (1; 0)) = (u (1; 1) u (1; 0)) = 3=4. 14 With these parameters, the period of the con ‡ict cycle T equals 10, and consequently the …gures show that cooperation restarts every 10 periods. That is, the probability that a con ‡ict snowball will have started by time t increases until t = 10, at which point this probability is so high that con ‡ict is no longer su¢ ciently informative about the other group's type (as indicated by the posterior belief in Figure 2 hitting the dotted line), and cooperation is restarted.
Additional Results
To help build intuition about the mechanics of the baseline model, we next present simple comparative statics on the cycle length T and results on social welfare when the probability of a misperception is small.
Our comparative statics result is as follows: First, cycles are longer when u (0; 0) is higher, u (1; 0)
is lower, or u (1; 1) is lower, as all of these changes make experimenting with the good action less appealing (i.e., they decrease ). Second, cycles are longer when the prior probability of the bad type is higher, as this makes players more pessimistic about the other group (i.e., increases t for 1 4 The …gures graph t mod T and 1 (1 ) t mod T as continuous functions of t, even though time is discrete in the model. implies that T must be small, and hence T must be large. Combining these observations, it follows that T is non-monotone in . 15 Summarizing, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 The period of the cycle in the baseline model T has the following properties:
1. It is increasing in u (0; 0), decreasing in u (1; 0), and decreasing in u (1; 1).
2. It is increasing in the prior probability of the bad type 0 .
3. It may be increasing or decreasing in the error probability .
Another interesting property of the baseline model is that expected social welfare when both groups are normal-averaged across all players-is bounded away from the e¢ cient level 2u (1; 1) , even as the probability of a misperception goes to 0. Thus, not only do some players receive payo¤ less = :5, then T = 11 when = :001 and T = 7 when = :4949, but T = 1 when = :1. Note that if we had instead written player t's utility function as u (xt;ỹt 1) + u (ỹt; xt+1) then would not depend on and hence T would be unambiguously decreasing in . than 2u (1; 1) for all > 0 (which is immediate), but the fraction of players who get less than this does not vanish as ! 0. The intuition is that, while the probability of a con ‡ict snowball starting each period goes to 0 as ! 0, the expected length of a con ‡ict snowball conditional on its starting goes to 1 as ! 0, because when is small con ‡ict is very informative and it therefore takes a long time for cooperation to restart after a misperception. This result is in stark contrast to what would happen in a static setting, where, as ! 0, the players could coordinate on the good outcome with probability approaching 1. 16 In contrast, expected social welfare when both groups are normal does converge to the e¢ cient level 2u (1; 1) when both the probability of a misperception and the probability that a group is bad 0 go to 0, regardless of the relative sizes of these probabilities. Thus, both the probability of accidental con ‡ict and the fear of the other group's true intentions must be small for e¢ ciency to prevail. The intuition here can be seen from examining the formula for t : if 0 is vanishingly small, then any positive probability of con ‡ict 1 (1 ) t is large enough that a player who observes con ‡ict will restart cooperation. Hence, the probability that con ‡ict actually occurs at any point in a given T -period cycle goes to 0 when both and 0 go to 0.
Formally, we have the following result, where social welfare is evaluated according to the limit-ofmeans criterion (proof in the Appendix). 17 Proposition 3 Suppose that both groups are normal. Then the following hold:
1. The limit of expected social welfare as ! 0 is less than the e¢ cient level 2u (1; 1).
2. For any sequence n ; 0;n converging to (0; 0) as n ! 1 (such that Assumptions 1-3 hold for all n), the limit of expected social welfare as n ! 1 equals the e¢ cient level 2u (1; 1).
Application 0: Ethnic Con ‡ict and International War
An immediate application of our baseline model is to ethnic con ‡ict and international war. Consider two ethnic groups (or two countries) who repeatedly face the potential for con ‡ict. For each potential con ‡ict, the groups choose between two actions sequentially, and one of these corresponds to aggression or war. We assume that representatives of the two ethnic groups alternate in taking the …rst action as in the baseline model. The "security dilemma," or the "Hobbesian trap," suggests a game form in which a group or country dislikes taking the peaceful action when the other side is aggressive. In our overlapping-generations setup, this exactly corresponds to parts 1-2 of Assumption 1, implying that aggression is a best response to the belief that the other side has been aggressive so far or is expected to be aggressive in the future. Part 3 of Assumption 1 then implies that both sides are better o¤ without such aggression. 18 1 6 More precisely, in the "static" (i.e., two-period version) of our model, the probability that both players play 1 when both groups are normal would converge to 1 as ! 0. 1 7 That is, if player t's payo¤ is ut, social welfare is de…ned to be limT !1 1 T P T t=0 ut. 1 8 One might argue that our baseline model would better capture the "…rst-mover advantage" aspect of ethnic con ‡ict if we allowed player t's payo¤ from choosing war after getting the peaceful signal from player t 1 to di¤er from her It is plausible in the context of such con ‡ict that non-aggressive acts are sometimes viewed as aggressive by the other party, justifying our assumption concerning the relationship between action and signals (i.e., betweenỹ and y). 19 Finally, we believe that, though extreme, the assumption that the past history of signals is not fully observed is also reasonable in this context. Even though we all have access to history books, it is di¢ cult to ascertain and agree on how and exactly when a given con ‡ict started (see also Section 6). Consequently, the structure of the baseline model together with Assumptions 1-3 can be applied to the analysis of ethnic con ‡ict or international war, and this leads to the equivalent of Proposition 1, accounting for potential con ‡ict snowballs and their endogenous cessation.
Application 1: Trade
Our …rst more detailed application is to cycles of distrust in inter-group trade. We present a simple model where members of one group will produce high-quality goods only if they expect members of the other group to produce high-quality goods for which they can trade. If everyone is afraid that the other group is unable or unwilling to produce high-quality goods (i.e., be a "bad" trading partner), then the equilibrium involves a cycle in which phases of trust and trade alternate with phases of distrust and the breakdown of production and trade.
Group A produces apples and Group B produces bananas. Group A members can produce rotten ("bad") apples for free regardless of whether Group A is normal or bad, but if it is normal (which occurs with probability 1 0 ), then they can also produce good apples at cost c > 0. Similarly for Group B and bananas.
All players live for 2 periods, and get utility from consuming one piece of fruit in each period.
Members of Group A have a taste for bananas, and get utility b > c from consuming a good banana, but only get utility d 2 (0; c) from consuming a good apple. Members of Group B get b from consuming a good apple and get d from consuming a good banana. No one gets utility from consuming rotten fruit. Assume also that a player gets utility " if she trades for her opponent's rotten fruit, where " > 0 is interpreted as a (small) transaction cost; with this interpretation, the payo¤ b of consuming the other group's fruit is the payo¤ net of the transaction cost. 20 At time t = 1; 2; : : :, a market opens in which players t and t 1 can exchange goods. Production by players t and t 1 for the time t market is staggered as we describe next. Each period is subdivided into three subperiods, which we denote as times t payo¤ from choosing war prior to player t + 1's playing peace; that is, if we allowed a player's payo¤ to depend on whether she moves …rst or second in a given con ‡ict. Our results would not be a¤ected by this generalization, so long as each con ‡ict remains a coordination game (i.e., a player wants to match her opponent's action or signal, regardless of whether she moves …rst or second). 1 9 An alternative that leads to identical results is to assume that even when a group mostly consists of normal, nonaggressive types, a few of its members may be aggressive (e.g., military commanders bent on initiating con ‡ict even when most politicians prefer peace).
2 0 The transaction cost plays only a minor technical role in the analysis as discussed below.
At time t 2 3 , normal player t 1 chooses whether to produce a good fruit or a rotten fruit for the time t market (bad players always produce rotten fruit), and her quality choice is denoted y t 1 2 f0; 1g (frotten; goodg). If she produces a good fruit, it immediately rots with probability . Both players then observe the …nal quality of her fruit, denotedỹ t 1 2 f0; 1g.
At time t 1 3 , normal player t chooses whether to produce a good fruit or a rotten fruit (having observedỹ t 1 ), and her quality choice is denoted by x t 2 f0; 1g (thus, x t is player t's quality choice at time t 1 3 for the time t market, and y t is her quality choice at time t + 1 3 for the time t + 1 market). Again, if she produces a good fruit, it rots with probability , and both players observe the …nal quality of her fruit, denotedx t 2 f0; 1g.
Finally, players t and t 1 arrive at the time t market. They then simultaneously decide on whether they would like to exchange goods: the exchange occurs if and only if both decide to do so.
Each player then consumes the fruit she is left with (and pays the transaction cost if trade occurred).
Player t 1 then dies, player t + 1 is born, and the game continues with player t making her quality choice at time t + Consider …rst the production decision of player 0. Let us conjecture that if player 0's fruit does not rot (ỹ 0 = 1), then normal player 1 will produce a good fruit and trade will occur provided that his fruit does not rot. Player 0's expected payo¤ from producing a good fruit is: 21
To see this, note that player 0 gets payo¤ b if player 1 is normal and neither fruit rots, while he gets payo¤ d if her fruit doesn't rot and either player 1 is normal but his fruit rots or player 1 is bad. On the other hand, player 0's expected payo¤ from producing a rotten fruit is 0, because rotten fruit never generates a good signal (and is worth zero in consumption). Therefore, player 0 produces a good fruit if and only if
Suppose that this is the case, and consider the production decisions of normal player 1 at time 2 3 . Clearly, she will choose to produce a bad fruit if player 0's fruit is bad, as in this case trade never occurs. In contrast, if player 0's fruit is good, the assumption that 0 < T RADE is su¢ cient to guarantee that she will choose to produce a good fruit. Intuitively, a good fruit is more attractive when one's partner's fruit is good, and the assumption that 0 < T RADE implies that producing a good fruit is optimal before knowing the quality of one's partner's fruit. 2 1 Here and in what follows, we take the limit " ! 0.
Next, consider the production decisions of normal player 1 at time 1 + 1 3 . His position is now similar to that of player 0 at time 1 3 , except that he has a di¤erent assessment of the probability that the other group is bad. In particular, if player 0's fruit was good, then he is certain that the other group is good. If player 0's fruit was bad, then he believes that the other group is bad with probability
as in the baseline model. Thus, if 1 is above the cuto¤ belief T RADE , then player 1 produces a bad fruit if player 0's fruit was bad.
The analogy with the baseline model should now be clear. Assuming that t 0 > T RADE for all t 0 < t, then when player t 1's fruit is bad player t believes that the other group is bad with probability
Once t drops below , player t will produce a good fruit for the time t + 1 market even if player t 1's fruit was bad, and trade will resume until the next time a good fruit rots.
Formally, impose the following versions of Assumptions 2 and 3 from the baseline model.
We obtain the following result (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 2 0 and 3 0 , the trade model has a unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. It has the following properties (where T T RADE min ft : t < T RADE g):
1. For every time t 6 = 0 mod T T RADE , normal player t plays x t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; approves trade in market t if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; plays y t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; and approves trade in market t + 1 if and only ifx t+1 = 1.
2. For every time t = 0 mod T T RADE , normal player t plays x t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; approves trade in market t if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; always plays y t = 1; and approves trade in market t + 1 if and only ifx t+1 = 1.
3. Bad players always play x t = 0; approve trade in market t if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1; always play y t = 0; and approve trade in market t + 1 if and only ifx t+1 = 1.
Proposition 4 is the analog of Proposition 1 for the model of trade, and has a similar intuition.
When an agent receives a rotten fruit, she reckons there is a su¢ ciently high probability that the other side is not a good trading partner, and decides not to incur the cost for producing high-quality fruit herself. This then creates a snowball e¤ect where distrust in the ability of the other sides to be a good trading partner perpetrates over time. But, for the same reason as in the baseline model, this snowball also comes to an end-after a while, one of the sides concludes that the observed lack of trade is not very informative, and thus experiments with producing a high-quality fruit, which restarts trade.
It is also worth noting that the role of the staggered nature of production for each market, the " transaction cost, and the strengthening of the solution concept from sequential equilibrium to trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Without these features, the strategy pro…le described in Proposition 4 would still be an equilibrium, but there would also be other, more "arti…cial" equilibria. For example, if production for each market were simultaneous, there would be an equilibrium in which players always produce low-quality fruit because they are sure that their trading partners do so as well. Without the transaction cost and trembling-hand perfection, there would be equilibria where, when both fruits are rotten, players use their trade approval decisions to send cheap talk messages (which are payo¤ irrelevant for them but matter for future generations).
Application 2: Communication
Another example of snowball e¤ects, and hence of potential cycles, is communication between two groups on opposite sides of an issue. Even though informative communication may be in the interest of both parties, the fear that the other side is extremist can prevent communication between "moderates" (normal players). In this section, we present a simple model illustrating this possibility. We assume that the interests of moderates on the two sides are su¢ ciently aligned to permit equilibrium communication in the absence of extremists-indeed, we take the extreme case where moderates on the two sides prefer the same policy, conditional on any state of the world. However, moderates will tune out the other side when they believe that they are listening to extremists. This implies that moderate communicators will not send extreme messages (so as to separate themselves from extremists), provided they believe the other group is likely to be moderate. This leads to cycles of moderation and extremism in communication.
Suppose that Group A is left-wing, while Group B is right-wing. There are overlapping generations, and each player lives for two periods, staggered across the groups. Informally, the model is as follows:
1. Every period, a state of the world, t , is randomly drawn and is observed by the old player.
2. The old player sends a message, s t , to the young player (who is from the other group), who then takes an action a t (as in a standard cheap talk game).
3. The young player then ages, and the stage game repeats.
In particular, if a representative of Group A is the "sender" (resp., "receiver") in period t, then a representative of Group B is the "sender" (resp., "receiver") in period t + 1.
More precisely, the model is as follows: The …rst representative of Group A is active in period 0 only, while subsequent representative of Group A are active in periods ft; t + 1g for t odd; and representatives of Group B are active in periods ft; t + 1g for t even. In every period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, the period t state t 2 f 1; 0; 1g is drawn independently, with probability 1 3 on each state, and is observed by the active Group A representative if t is even, and by the active Group B representative if t is odd. The player who observes the state (the "sender") then sends a message s t 2 f 1; 0; 1g to the other player (the "receiver"), who receives messages t 2 f 1; 0; 1g, wheres t equals s t with probability 1 2 3 , ands t equals each of the other two possible messages with probability 3 each (thus, the message is replaced with "white noise" with probability ). Finally, the receiver takes an action a t 2 f 1; 0; 1g, and the game moves on to period t + 1.
Each group consists either entirely of moderates, entirely of extremists, or entirely of naifs (i.e., "naive" players). The probability that a group consists entirely of extremists is 0 > 0, and the probability that a group consists entirely of naifs is 0 > 0. Extremists and naifs are modelled as "behavioral types." It is assumed that left-wing extremists always send message s t = 1 and take action a t = 1, and right-wing extremists always send message s t = 1 and take action a t = 1. Naifs, on the other hand, always send message s t = t and take action a t =s t ; this implies that naifs can be in ‡uenced by even extreme messages. Finally, a left-wing moderate who is active in period t gets utility u L (a t ; t ) when action a t is taken in state t , and a right-wing moderate gets utility u R (a t ; t ); thus, for example, a left-wing moderate who is active in periods t and t + 1 gets utility
We assume that these payo¤s are realized at the end of period t + 1, so that there is no information revealed from payo¤ realizations.
In addition, we assume that both left and right-wing moderates have preferences that satisfy singlecrossing in (a; ) and are single peaked with bliss point equal to the state t at time t. This implies that left-wing and right-wing moderates always agree on the best action when the state of the world is known. However, we assume that a left-wing moderate prefers action 1 when she believes that the state is distributed "fairly evenly" on f 1; 0; 1g, while a right-wing moderate prefers action 1 when he believes this, in a sense formalized below. In addition, we assume that u L (a; ) = u R ( a; ) for all (a; ). This simply allows us to avoid stating separate assumptions for u L and u R ; none of our analysis relies on this symmetry.
We again impose a range of assumptions on u L (where the corresponding assumptions on u R are implied by symmetry) in order to focus on the most interesting region of parameter space. To facilitate exposition, we state these assumptions "parametrically"; we view them as being fairly weak in the leading case where is small relative to the other parameters. 22 In particular, using the notation "belief (x; y; z)" to stand for the belief that the state is 1 with probability x, 0 with probability y, and 1 with probability z, we impose: 2 2 For concreteness, a "typical" example satisfying the next assumption is given by = :01, 0 = :5, 0 = :1, and Assumption COM 1. Action 1 is optimal for a left-wing moderate given belief
e., the state is equally likely to be 1 and 0, and somewhat more likely to be 1).
2. Action 0 is optimal for a left-wing moderate given belief
e., the state is equally likely to be 1 and 1, and much more likely to be 0).
Action 0 is optimal for left-wing moderate given belief
, state is most likely to be 0, somewhat less likely to be 1, and much less likely to be 1).
Finally, for reasons familiar from cheap talk games, sequential equilibrium is not unique in this model, even under appropriate payo¤ restrictions (unlike in our other models). For example, one can always "switch"messages 0 and 1, say, so that message 0 corresponds to state 1 and vice versa. 23 We therefore impose the mild restriction of message-monotonicity: a sequential equilibrium is message monotone if for all histories, if a normal sender sends signal s with positive probability when the state is , then she never sends a signal strictly lower than s when the state is strictly higher than . 24 The result is the following (proof in Appendix):
uL (a; ) given by the following 2 3 This is true even though our game is not quite a cheap talk game, due to the presence of naifs. If there are enough naifs ( 0 large), then one could recover uniqueness, but it is natural to think of 0 as small. 2 4 This is adapted from Chen's (2011) de…nition of message monotonicity to allow for mixed strategies. Chen assumes concave loss functions and a continuous action space, ensuring that all sequential equilibria are in pure strategies. Here, we allow for mixed strategies, even though we will show that all message-monotone sequential equilibria will still be in pure strategies.
It is also worth noting that while messages are assumed to be monotone in t, receiver actions are not monotone inst in the unique equilibrium of our model. This is fundamentally for the same reason as in Chen (2011) : extreme messages may be more likely to come from biased senders, and therefore are discounted. In fact, our model is quite similar to a (special case of a) dynamic and two-sided version of Chen's model with three kinds of senders (moderate, extreme, and naive) rather than two (normal and naive). See also Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) 1. For all times t, left-wing moderate senders send s t = 0 if t = 1 ands t 1 2 f 1; 0g (or if t = 0), and otherwise send s t = t . Right-wing moderate senders send s t = 0 if t = 1 and Intuitively, Proposition 5 shows that, in the unique message-monotone equilibrium, moderates start by moderating their "own-extreme" signals. In particular, left-wing senders will misreport a signal of 1 (and right-wingers will misreport 1) as 0 so as to separate themselves from the extremists on their side. Moderating one's own-extreme signal in this way is analogous to playing the honest action in the baseline model, in that it leads to Pareto-improving communication when the other group is moderate. In the future, signals other than the sender's own-extreme signal are interpreted as honest signals, and a moderate player who receives an honest signal plays action equal to the signal, and then moderates her own signal next period. But then in this equilibrium an extreme signal is evidence that the sender is an extremist, and a moderate from the other side who receives such a signal takes the opposite action and does not moderate her own signal in the next period (i.e., she sends her own-extreme signal if she thinks this is the state, in an e¤ort to persuade naive receivers). This then starts a snowball analogous to the snowballs we have seen in the baseline and trade models. Nevertheless, there are also important di¤erences from the models we have seen so far.
First, here the reason why moderates refrain from sending extreme messages is precisely because they would like to distinguish themselves from extremists-thus the presence of extremists a¤ects the form of communication between moderates even outside the cycle of distrust. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there are no longer any deterministic restarts of trust here. This is because the stochastic restarts of trust are frequent enough, ensuring that an own-extreme signal is always a strong indication that the sender is extremist. 25 
Application 3: Political Partisanship and Participation
Our last and most detailed application is to cycles of political partisanship and political participation.
A standard-though not uncontroversial-narrative is that polarization in American politics was high in the …rst third of the 20th century, low in the middle third, and high in the last third. The model we present in this section provides an approach for thinking about polarization between political parties in the absence of polarization of the electorate. In particular, we consider political competition between two parties that can each be either moderate or extremist. Every period, the representative of the party in power can take action on either a major, common interest issue (e.g., the economy) or a partisan issue (e.g., school prayer). Taking action on the major issue requires some form of cooperation from the previous political leader; we model this by assuming that the previous leader may learn some information about the economy that must be passed on for the current leader to set economic policy e¤ectively. 26 Whether or not this cooperation is granted is observed by the political supporters of the incumbent party-referred to as its "base"-and can in ‡uence their decision on whether or not to turn out to vote (in an extension of the model, we allow both parties'bases to turn out). The di¤erence between moderate and extremist politicians is that moderates care more about the major issue, while extremists care more about the partisan issue; thus, unlike in our earlier models, we do not assume that extremists are committed to some course of action, and the behavior of both moderates and extremists is determined by strategic considerations.
We show that this model leads to a distinctive pattern of partisanship and turnout that resembles the cycles of distrust in our baseline model. Extremists never cooperate or communicate with the other party, because in equilibrium cooperating would signal to the base that the other party is moderate and the base would therefore not bother turning out. Moderates cooperate as long as they believe that the other party is su¢ ciently likely to be moderate. In equilibrium, a single accidental failure of cooperation leads to a partisan phase in which no parties cooperate, the bases turn out, and politicians act only on the partisan issue. However, eventually a politician realizes that a partisan phase was quite likely to have started by accident, and hence cooperates with the other party, which leads to a trusting phase where both parties cooperate, the bases do not turn out, and politicians act only on the major issue. As in the baseline model, these phases alternate-and are driven by the extent to which the parties trust each other.
Since this model has more moving parts than the others, we split this section into three subsections. Subsection 5.1 presents the model, subsection 5.2 characterizes the unique equilibrium, and subsection 5.3 extends the model by allowing both parties'bases to turn out.
Model
Group A is a left-wing party and Group B is a right-wing party. In every period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, a representative of the group in power is the leader ("player t"). A di¤erent representative is chosen every period, and representatives do not know what happened in past periods (including which group was in power-the dynamics of power holding are described below). Each group can either consist entirely of moderates or entirely of extremists. The probability that a group consists entirely of extremists is 0 > 0. Both moderates and extremists are policy-motivated but they di¤er in what political issues they …nd more important.
Every period, player t can take action on one of two issues: the "major issue" w t or the "partisan issue" z t . Players' ideal actions on the partisan issue are …xed over time and commonly known. In contrast, the period t state t 2 f 1; 1g is drawn independently every period, with probability The timing is as follows: At the beginning of period t, the identity of the group in power and its representative, player t, is determined. Player t then observes t , and also observes t 1 if player t 1 successfully communicated states. Player t then chooses which issue to "take action"on. Taking action on the major issue means choosing a policy w t 2 [ 1; 1] for the major issue, while taking action on the partisan issue means choosing a policy z t 2 [ 1; 1] for the partisan issue, and in either case it is assumed that the period t policy on the issue on which action is not taken is set equal to the default policy 0. Finally, player t decides whether to attempt to communicate t to player t + 1. Note that player t makes these decisions without knowing which group will be in power in period t + 1.
Player t cares about policy on both issues in periods t and t + 1. The di¤erence between left-wing players and right-wing players is that they have opposite preferences about the partisan issue: left-wing players have bliss point z t = 1, and right-wing players have bliss point z t = 1. The di¤erence between moderates and extremists is that moderates think the major issue is more important than the partisan issue, while extremists think the partisan issue is more important. 27 Formally, the relative importance of the two issues is measured by a constant 2 (0; 1). Moderate player t of type 2 f 1; +1g, where 1 corresponds to left-wing and +1 corresponds to right wing, has payo¤ u m (w t ; w t+1 ; z t ; z t+1 ; t ; t+1 ) = jw t t 1 j jw t+1 t j jz t j jz t+1 j .
Extremist player t of type has payo¤ u e (w t ; w t+1 ; z t ; z t+1 ; t ; t+1 ) = jw t t 1 j jw t+1 t j jz t j jz t+1 j .
These payo¤ functions make it clear that the only di¤erence between moderates and extremists is in the weights that they put on the major and the partisan issues, and the only di¤erence between left and right-wing players is in their bliss point for the partisan issue.
We now describe the dynamics of power holding. Which group holds power in the initial period t = 0 is determined by the ‡ip of a fair coin, and in every subsequent period t = 1; 2; : : : which group holds power is determined by an election at the end of period t 1. The potential voters are either "independents"or are members of a group of organized supporters of the left or the right, referred to henceforth as the left and right bases. A base has to pay some cost c > 0 in order to organize and motivate their supporters to turn out for the election, and we assume (for now) that a base can only do this if its own party is in power. Thus, the incumbent party's base will turn out for the election if the potential gain compensates for the cost of organization. We assume that the number of net votes from independent voters for the incumbent party in each period is given by an independent draw from some distribution G symmetric about 0; hence, without turnout from the bases, the incumbent party wins the election with probability G (0) = 1 2 . The size of each base is k, so when the supporters of the incumbent party turn out, that party wins with probability G (k) > 1 2 , and to simplify notation we let 1 G (k). Note that turning out increases the probability that the incumbent party wins by
. We assume that < (2 ) , and that
where these assumptions serve only to focus attention on the most interesting region of parameter space. We also assume that the incumbent's base at time t consists of individuals who are in their youth at time t, and have the same payo¤ functions as moderate politicians.
The last element of the model is the information of the base. We assume that the period t base knows only whether its group is in power (but not whether it is moderate or extremist) and the realizations t . The interpretation is thats t = 1 represents an "informative" message to the next leader, whiles t = 0 represents a "propaganda" message to the base (and the probability law fors t re ‡ects the fact that a message that is meant to be informative may be misinterpreted as propaganda).
We also continue to assume that all players observe calendar time.
Equilibrium
We now show that this model has a sequential equilibrium in which politicians behave much as in the baseline model-where attempting communication is like the "honest"action, and sending propaganda is like the "cheating" action-and where the base turns out if and only if it receives propaganda, and that the equilibrium is unique for generic parameter values (proof in the Appendix). 28 Proposition 6 The political partisanship model has a sequential equilibrium with the following property, and it is unique for generic parameter values:
There exists an integer T P OL > 0 such that 1. At every time t 6 = 0 mod T P OL , moderate player t plays (w t = t 1 ; s t = 1) ifs t 1 = 1, and otherwise plays (z t = 1; s t = 0) (if left-wing) or (z t = 1; s t = 0) (if right-wing).
2. At every time t = 0 mod T P OL , moderate player t plays (w t = t 1 ; s t = 1) ifs t 1 = 1 (or if t = 0), and otherwise plays (z t = 1; s t = 1) (if left-wing) or (z t = 1; s t = 1) (if right-wing).
3. Extremist player t always plays (z t = 1; s t = 0) if left-wing or (z t = 1; s t = 0) if right-wing.
The base turns out if and only if it receives propaganda.
There are several di¤erences between Proposition 6 and Proposition 1. First, the analogy between sending informative messages and the "honest" action in the baseline model must be established.
A preliminary observation is that extremists always act on the partisan issue, because for them the partisan issue is more important than the major issue. Moderates, on the other hand, act on the major issue if and only if they receive information about the current state, since they cannot improve on the default policy on the major issue unless they are informed of the current state. Now, given that the base turns out if and only if it receives propaganda, the bene…t of attempting communication is greater when the opposing group is more likely to be moderate, while the cost of attempting communication (i.e., the opportunity cost of not sending propaganda) does not depend on whether the opposing group is moderate (as after propaganda the next leader always acts on the partisan issue, as she is not informed of the state). Thus, sending informative messages is like the "honest" action in the baseline model.
Second, the incentives of the base must be accounted for. This is straightforward, because when the base hears propaganda it knows that it is in a partisan phase, so its belief about the opposing group is irrelevant (as in a partisan phase moderates and extremists play the same way), and the assumption that c < 1 2
(2 ) implies that the base turns out. When the base hears communication, it infers that the opposing group is extremist with at most the prior probability 0 (i.e., hearing communications is "good news" about the other group's type), in which case the assumption that (1 + ) 0 implies that the base does not turn out.
Third, the probability of power changes is now endogenous and depends on the two groups'types, so that now the fact that a particular group …nds itself in power is informative of the other group's type.
This makes Bayesian updating somewhat subtle. Nonetheless, Lemma 2 in the Appendix shows that moderate player t's assessment of the probability that the opposing group is extremist, t (conditional on player t 1 failing to communicate and player t's group holding power in period t), behaves as in the baseline model in the long run, and also that 1 ! 1 as ! 0 (which implies that T P OL > 1 for small , so that partisan cycles are not trivial).
Allowing Both Bases to Turn Out
We now dispense with the simplifying assumption that only the base of the incumbent party can turn out. The rest of the model is as above, and in particular the out-of-power period t base cannot receive propaganda from its party, so it cannot infer whether or not the period t leader successfully communicates (unlike the in-power period t base). Therefore, the out-of-power period t base can condition its turnout decision only on calendar time.
The following result shows that there are two possible consequences of letting the out-of-power base turn out: either it never turns out in equilibrium, and in this case, the equilibrium is exactly as in Proposition 6, or it turns out deterministically in the later periods of each cycle, in which case the cycle length can also be di¤erent from T P OL .
Proposition 7
When the out-of-power base can turn out, one of the following two statements hold, and each holds for some parameter values:
1. The out-of-power base never turns out in sequential equilibrium, and the (generically unique) sequential equilibrium strategies for the politicians and the in-power base are exactly as in the main partisanship model.
2. There exist integersT <T such that the (generically unique) sequential equilibrium strategies for the politicians and the in-power base are as in the main partisanship model with cycle length T , and the out-of-power base turns out at time t if and only if t T modT .
Proposition 7 shows that partisan cycles behave much as in the main partisanship model when both bases can turn out. However, the corresponding turnout cycle now has an additional deterministic component: in each cycle, the out-of-power base turns out deterministically after a certain cuto¤ timê T . Thus, the overall turnout cycle is given by stochastic turnout of the in-power base coinciding with the onset of the partisan phase, deterministic turnout by the out-of-power base in the latter part of each cycle, and a deterministic drop in turnout at the end of each cycle.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is that the out-of-power base would like to turn out if and only if the partisan cycle has begun. Since this is more likely later in each cycle, the out-of-power base turns out deterministically after a certain cuto¤ timeT in each cycle. If the implied cuto¤ time is greater than the cycle lengthT , then the out-of-power base never turns out (in which caseT must equal the cycle length in the main partisanship model, T P OL ).
Extensions
This section presents three extensions of the baseline model, each relaxing a simplifying assumption made in the main analysis. The goal is to show that our main explanation of cycles of distrust-and thus our analysis of the applications-is not overly sensitive to these assumptions. Section 6.1 allows the bad action to generate the good signal, as well as the other way around. Section 6.2 replaces the deterministic dependence on calendar time with stochastic cycles generated by additional information about the previous player's type. Section 6.3 allows players to observe the signals of actions taken more than one period ago.
Two-Sided Errors
The analysis of the baseline model was simpli…ed by the assumption that only the good action can generate the good signal. This section shows that our main conclusions still apply when either action can generate either signal.
In particular, assume now that the signalỹ t 1 is distributed as follows:
where ; 0 2 (0; 1) and + 0 < 1. We explain the role of the assumption that + 0 < 1 below.
The analog of Assumption 2, which guarantees that normal player 0 plays y 0 = 1, is the following:
Assumption 2 00 (1 ) (u (1; 1) u (1; 0)) > 0 (u (0; 1) u (0; 0)), and
As in the baseline model, Assumption 1 guarantees that normal player t > 0 plays x t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1, so it remains only to determine when normal player t plays y t = 1. This depends on her assessment of the probability that the other group is bad after observingỹ t 1 ; as usual, denote her assessment of this probability after observingỹ t 1 = 0 by t , and denote her assessment of this probability after observingỹ t 1 = 1 (which equals 0 in the baseline model, due to one-sided errors) by 0 t . To compute these probabilities, let
be the Markov transition matrix governing the evolution ofỹ t in the event that both groups are normal, under the hypothesis that normal players play y t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 0. That is, if both groups are normal andỹ t = 1, thenỹ t+1 = 1 with probability 1 , while ifỹ t = 0 thenỹ t+1 = 1 with probability 0 . Then, by Bayes rule,
, where M t (1;1) is the (1; 1) coordinate of the t th power of M . This is simply because the probability of observingx t 1 = 0 conditional on the other group being bad equals 1 0 , while the probability of observingx t 1 = 0 conditional on the other group being good is 1 M t  (1;1) . Similarly,
.
We may now explain the role of the assumption that + 0 < 1. It may be easily checked that the eigenvalues of the matrix M are 1 and 1 ( + 0 ). Hence, the assumption that + 0 < 1 guarantees that M t (1;1) converges to its steady-state value of 0 + 0 monotonically in t, and in particular that t > 0 t for all t, so that observingỹ t = 1 is always "good news" about the other group's type. The genericity assumption is now:
In the baseline model, it was the case that t ! 0 as t ! 1, so Assumption 2 guaranteed the existence of a time T such that T < . With two-sided errors, M t (1;1) ! 0 + 0 as t ! 1, so t ! 1 as t ! 1, where
If 1 < 2 SIDED , then Assumption 2 00 guarantees the existence of a smallest time T 2 SIDED such that T 2 SIDED < 2 SIDED , and there is a deterministic cycle with period T 2 SIDED , as in the baseline model. If on the other hand 1 2 SIDED , then there is no deterministic cycle, and in particular a bad signal always leads to a snowball of bad actions that lasts until the next accidental good signal.
Summarizing, we have the following result (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1, 2 00 , and 3 00 , the model with two-sided errors has a unique sequential equilibrium. If 1 < , then the equilibrium has the following properties:
1. At every time t 6 = 0 mod T 2 SIDED , normal player t plays the good actions (x t = 1; y t = 1) if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, and plays the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0) if she gets the bad signal
2. At every time t = 0 mod T 2 SIDED , normal player t plays the good action x t = 1 toward player t 1 if and only if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, but plays the good action y t = 1 toward player t + 1 regardless of her signal.
3. Bad players always play bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0). 1 , then the equilibrium has the following properties:
If instead
1. At every time t > 0, normal player t plays the good actions (x t = 1; y t = 1) if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, and plays the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0) if she gets the bad signalỹ t 1 = 0.
2. Normal player 0 plays the good action y 0 = 1 toward player 1.
3. Bad players always play the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0).
Independence from Calendar Time
One highly stylized aspect of the baseline model is the strict dependence of behavior on calendar time.
In particular, the T th player plays the good action (toward the next player) regardless of her signal, while the T 1 st player plays the good action only if she gets the good signal. This "discontinuous"
behavior is driven by the endogenously changing informativeness of the bad signal (or con ‡ict) about the other group's type. In particular, the T th player, correctly, thinks observing con ‡ict is su¢ ciently likely that it is uninformative, while it is slightly more informative for the T 1 st player; and this di¤erence is enough to cause them to behave di¤erently in equilibrium. Thus, the di¤erent behavior of the T th and T 1 st players is not driven by calendar time per se-after all, nobody directly cares about calendar time-but rather by the informativeness of con ‡ict.
This section clari…es this idea by assuming that with probability q 2 (0; 1), independently of all other random variables, player t is "crazy." Thus, each group consists of either 1 q normal players and q crazy players, or 1 q bad players and q crazy players. Crazy players are more inclined to play the bad actions x t = 0 and y t = 0 than normal players are; for simplicity, we just assume that they always play (x t = 0; y t = 0) though this is not necessary. Crazy players also di¤er from both normal and bad players in that their type is observable to the next player. That is, every player t observes whether or not player t 1 was crazy, in addition to observingx t 1 .
The point of adding crazy players to the baseline model is that now if player t sees that player t 1 was crazy, then she becomes like player T in the baseline model in that for her con ‡ict is uninformative of the other group's type. Therefore, normal players always cooperate when the previous player was crazy. In addition, if there are enough crazy players, there are no longer deterministic restarts of trust, because getting the bad signal from a non-crazy player is always a strong signal that the other group is bad. In this case, whether or not players observe calendar time in the model becomes irrelevant, but cycles of distrust emerge again for reasons similar to those in the baseline model.
To see this formally, …rst note that the analog of Assumption 2, which guarantees that normal player 0 plays y 0 = 1, is now:
As usual, let t be the probability that normal player t assigns to the other group being normal after getting a bad signal from a non-crazy player, under the hypothesis that normal players play y t = 0 if and only if they get a bad signal from a non-crazy player. The following lemma characterizes t :
Lemma 1 We have
This is decreasing in t, and satis…es lim t!1 t 1 < CRAZY if and only if
which is a positive number under Assumption 2 000 .
The genericity assumption is now modi…ed to:
Assumption 3 000 t 6 = CRAZY for all t 2 N.
We now describe the unique equilibrium. When both groups are normal, con ‡ict phases always begin with a misunderstanding and end with the arrival of a crazy player. Whether there is also a deterministic component of con ‡ict cycles (as there is in the baseline model) depends on whether q is greater or less than q . If q < q , then eventually being in a con ‡ict phase is weak enough evidence that the other group is bad that normal players restart trust (i.e., 1 < CRAZY ), so there are deterministic restarts. But if q > q , then being in a con ‡ict cycle is always strong enough evidence that the other group is bad that normal players do not restart (i.e., 1 > CRAZY ), so restarts are purely stochastic.
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions 1, 2 000 , and 3 000 , the model with crazy types has a unique sequential equilibrium. If q < q , then the equilibrium has the following properties (where T CRAZY min ft : t < CRAZY g):
1. At every time t 6 = 0 mod T CRAZY , normal player t plays the good actions (x t = 1; y t = 1) if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, and plays the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0) if she gets the bad signal
2. At every time t = 0 mod T CRAZY , normal player t plays the good action x t = 1 toward player t 1 if and only if she gets the good signalỹ t 1 = 1, but plays the good action y t = 1 toward player t + 1 regardless of her signal.
3. Bad players and crazy players always play the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0).
If q > q , then the equilibrium has the following properties:
1. At every time t > 0, normal player t plays good actions (x t = 1; y t = 1) if she gets the good signal y t 1 = 1, and plays the bad actions (x t = 0; y t = 0) if she gets the bad signalỹ t 1 = 0.
The proof is straightforward given Proposition 1 and Lemma 1: If q < q then 1 < CRAZY , and hence t < CRAZY for su¢ ciently large t, so T CRAZY is well-de…ned. The result in this case is analogous to Proposition 1. In contrast, if q > q then 1 > CRAZY , and hence t > CRAZY for all t. So normal player t plays y t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1.
More Information About the Past
In the baseline model, players observe a signal of only the most recent action y t 1 , and get no information about any earlier actions. Though this simple information structure allowed us explicitly characterize equilibrium and show that it features "restarts" of trust every T periods, it is not necessary for our main intuition for cycling. This section shows that when players observe the previous K signals, for any integer K, there are still deterministic restarts of trust (though not necessarily at regular intervals); in particular, we show that there are still in…nitely many times t at which a normal player plays the good action x t = 1 even if she observes K bad signals, and that this occurs for essentially the same reason as in the baseline model. 29 Formally, let us modify the baseline model by supposing that players observe the previous K signals, for some …xed integer K. That is, before choosing her action, player t observes ỹ t K ;ỹ t (K 1) ; : : : ;ỹ t 1 , where this vector is truncated at 0 if t < K. Player t's utility function is still given by u (x t ;ỹ t 1 ) + u (y t ; x t+1 ), exactly as in the baseline model.
Proposition 10
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, in any sequential equilibrium of the model where players observe the last K signals, there are in…nitely many times t at which normal player t plays the good action y t = 1 toward player t + 1 with positive probability when she observes all bad signals (i.e., wheñ y t k = 0 for all k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg).
Proposition 10 and its proof, which is presented in the Appendix, show that our main intuition for cycling goes through when players observe any number of past signals, not just one. However, when K > 1 cycling is no longer regular (i.e., there is no longer a restart of trust every T periods), and explicitly characterizing equilibrium seems very challenging. 30 
Related Theoretical Literature
Before concluding the paper, we take a moment to relate it, from a more theoretical perspective, to several existing classes of models that provide explanations for cyclic behavior in dynamic games:
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, stochastic games, reputation models of credibility, reputation models with limited records, and dynamic games with overlapping generations of players.
In abstract terms, our baseline model is best described as a reputation model with limited records and overlapping generations, and it is to our knowledge the …rst such model in the literature. A central and distinguishing feature of our model is the dynamic path of actions driven deterministically and uniquely by the endogenous information content of those actions. 31 More speci…cally, the fact that our key mechanism can lead to deterministic cycles-together with the uniqueness of equilibriumhighlights that it is in essence very di¤erent from the existing literature (though we have shown in Sections 4 and 6 that variants of our model can also generate patterns of behavior that are more complicated and realistic than regular deterministic cycles).
Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring date back to Green and Porter (1984) . In their model, cyclic equilibrium behavior is due to moral hazard: bad signals lead to phases of bad actions, and vice versa. Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1988, 1990) show this behavior can in fact emerge in optimal equilibria. Yared (2010) applies these insights to cycles of war and peace. These models di¤er from ours in that they have no incomplete information about types, they do not feature deterministic cycles, and they do not have equilibrium uniqueness. Typically, these models do not have deterministic cycles or equilibrium uniqueness.
Among reputation models, the literature on "credibility,"starting with Sobel (1985) and Benabou and Laroque (1992), is particularly related. In these models, there is a deterministic or stochastic cycle in which a long-run player builds her reputation by being trustworthy against a series of shortrun players, before cheating them and thus burning her reputation. As such, cycling is a short-run phenomenon that ends when players'types are learned. Their model does not have incomplete information about player types or deterministic cycles.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model of cycles of distrust and inter-group con ‡ict based on the classical idea that con ‡ict often results from distrust of the other side. In a dynamic context, a real or perceived aggression from one group makes it appear as innately aggressive to the other side, which in response acts more aggressively itself. When the …rst group cannot be sure whether this new aggression is a response to its own action or is due to the other side's actually being aggressive, a snowball of aggression and con ‡ict forms. But-as our model shows-such a snowball cannot last forever, because it eventually becomes almost certain that a con ‡ict snowball will have gotten started accidentally, at which point aggressive actions become completely uninformative of the other group's type. At such a time, a group experiments with the trusting action, and cooperation is restored.
We have also argued that this mechanism is robust and can be useful in understanding a range of situations in which there are (endogenous) cycles of distrust. First, the presence of a …rst-mover advantage in violent con ‡ict makes our approach relevant to cycles of Hobbesian ethnic con ‡ict or international war. Second, a similar mechanism emerges in a simple model of production and trade and can account for cycles of trade and its breakdown. Third, we study cycles of miscommunication in a model where moderates would like to communicate with moderates from the other group, and
show that the fear that the other side consists of extremists may lead to cycles of communication and communication breakdown. Finally, we show that similar forces can lead to cycles of political partisanship in a dynamic model of policy choice and voter turnout.
Though our basic mechanism is simple, it is both di¤erent from existing explanations for cyclic behavior in dynamic games and, we believe, potentially relevant for understanding why seemingly unending con ‡icts end, and why cooperation and communication often follow periods of distrust.
Our model points to several possible areas for future research. On the theoretical side, it would be interesting to study the more complicated reputational incentives that would emerge if players lived for more than one period, and also to consider di¤erent ways in which players might learn about the history of con ‡ict and cooperation between the groups (though we make some progress in this direction in Section 6). Finally, empirical analysis is needed to determine whether the mechanism we highlight-agents concluding that long-lasting con ‡icts are no longer informative about the true intentions of the other party-can indeed account for cycles of distrust, con ‡ict, polarization, and communication breakdown in practice.
This of course implies that (1 ) 0 . Now, by Proposition 1, expected (limit-of-means) social welfare equals expected average social welfare within each T -period block. Consider for example the …rst block, consisting of periods 1 to T 1. Continuing to let u t be player t's payo¤, and assuming that both groups are normal, this equals
We are interested in evaluating this expression as ! 0, which also implies (from (1)) T ! 1. Thus, the expression of interest is 
()
where the inequality holds for all 0 > 0. Finally, proof of the second part of the proposition is completed by observing that the limit of expected social welfare as n ! 1 equals 2u (0; 0) + 2 lim
and that
where the …nal equality uses 0;n ! 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that in any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (henceforth, "equilibrium") a player (good or bad) approves trade if and only if her opponent's fruit is good. This follows because trade strictly increases a player's payo¤ if her opponent's fruit is good and strictly decreases a player's payo¤ if her opponent's fruit is bad-regardless of the quality of her own fruitand perfection requires that a player's approval decision is a best response to a completely mixed strategy of her opponent's. 32 Second, note that in any equilibrium normal player t plays x t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1. To see this, note that her expected payo¤ in market t when she produces a good fruit and her opponent's fruit is good equals
Her expected payo¤ in market t when she produces a bad fruit is 0. In addition, her expected payo¤ in market t + 1 does not depend on her choice of x t , (because player t + 1's strategy cannot depend on the outcome of market t, and player t 1's trade approval decision cannot give player t any information about the other group's type since a player's trade approval decision is independent of her type).
Finally, Assumption 2 0 implies that T RADE > 0, which in turn implies that (1 ) b c > 0. So Assumption 2 0 implies that normal player t plays x t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1.
It remains only to determine when normal player t plays y t = 1. We proceed by induction on t.
Suppose that play in every equilibrium is as speci…ed by the proposition for all t 0 t < T , t 2 N.
Then at time t + 1 3 , normal player t's assessment of the probability that the other group is good is 1 ifỹ t 1 = 1 and is t ifỹ t 1 = 0 (and is 0 if t = 0). Then normal player t's expected payo¤ in market t + 1 when she produces a good fruit and her assessment is equals
while her expected payo¤ in market t + 1 when she produces a bad fruit equals 0. Hence, she produces a good fruit if < T RADE and produces a bad fruit if > T RADE . Since t > T RADE by de…nition of T , it follows that she plays y t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1. This proves that play in every equilibrium is as speci…ed by the proposition for all t < T .
The same argument now implies that, as speci…ed in the proposition, normal player T 's assessment is below T RADE regardless ofỹ T 1 (strictly so, by Assumption 3 0 ). This implies that she always plays y T = 1. Repeating the argument from the previous paragraph now implies that play in every equilibrium is as in the proposition for all t 2 fT + 1; : : : ; 2T g, and inducting on k 2 N then implies that play is as in the proposition for all t 2 fkT + 1; : : : ; (k + 1) T g for any k 2 N, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We …rst establish the existence of an equilibrium of this form, and then show that it is unique.
Let t denote the probability that player t does not moderate her signal (i.e., sends s t = t for all t ) when both players are normal and follow the strategies described in the proposition; this is the same as the probability thats t 1 equals player t 1's own-extreme signal. We calculate player t's posterior belief about (1) the state, and (2) her opponent's type, in terms of t , conditional on the received signal. For these calculations, suppose that the receiver is right-wing-the other case is symmetric.
Posteriors about the state are as follows:
After signals = 1:
This follows from Bayes rule by noting that the probabilities of the following joint events are: 
For the prescribed strategies to be an equilibrium it is required that, for all t, the receiver plays a = 1 afters = 1, plays a = 0 afters = 0, and plays a = 1 afters = 1. The …rst and third of these conditions are implied by Part 1 of Assumption COM (noting that afters = 1, playing a = 1 is less appealing when t is higher, and Part 1 of Assumption COM implies that playing a = 1 is optimal for t = 1). The second of these conditions is implied by Part 2 of Assumption COM (as this implies that the condition holds for t = 0 and t = 1, and preferences are single-crossing in (a; )).
Posteriors about the opponent's type (again assuming a right-wing receiver and again using the above expressions) are as follows:
After signals = 0:
Here, we need that it is always optimal for the receiver to moderate his signal in the next period (i.e., send 0 when = 1) afters = 1 ands = 1, but not afters = 0. It is easy to see that when she does so followings = 1, she will also do it a fortiori followings = 1. Now it is optimal for a sender with beliefs t and t to moderate her signal if and only if
So we need to show that, for any t 2 [0; 1], this inequality holds whenever t and t result from signal s = 0, while the opposite inequality holds whenever t and t result from signals = 1. 33 A bit of algebra shows that Part 3 of Assumption COM is a su¢ cient condition for this to be the case.
The existence of an equilibrium of the speci…ed form follows by noting that s t = t is optimal when t is not one's own-extreme state (and this is in fact true regardless of the receiver's type).
The proof of uniqueness of the message-monotone sequential equilibrium (henceforth "equilibrium") proceeds in …ve steps. Let us continue to assume a right-wing receiver.
Step 1: In any equilibrium, moderate receivers play a = 1 after signals = 1.
Since preferences satisfy single-crossing in (a; ), it su¢ ces to check that a moderate receiver plays a = 1 after signals = 1 when moderate senders send s = 1 after = 1 and = 0, but not after = 1. This condition is exactly Part 1 of Assumption COM. 34 Step 2: In any equilibrium, moderate receivers play a = 1 after signals = 1.
By message-monotonicity, the posterior distribution after signals = 1 is weakly higher (in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance) than it would be if all senders sent signal s = 1 for all . Part 1 of Assumption COM then implies that a moderate receiver plays a = 1 in that case, so the claim follows from single-crossing.
Step 3: In any equilibrium, moderate senders send s = 1 when = 1.
This follows from
Step 2, as sending s = 1 is then optimal against every type of receiver, and strictly optimal against naive and moderate receivers.
Step 4: In any equilibrium, moderate receivers play a = 0 after signals = 0, and moderate senders send s = 0 when = 0.
First, suppose moderate receivers play a = 1 with probability 1 afters = 0. Then moderate senders would send s = 0 when = 0 (as the moderate and extreme receivers would be playing a = 1 always, so moderate senders would target the naive receivers). But then Part 2 of Assumption COM would imply that moderate receivers should play a = 0 afters = 0, yielding a contraction.
Therefore, a moderate receiver must play either a = 1 or a = 0 with positive probability after s = 0. This implies that moderate senders send s = 0 when = 0, as this is clearly optimal against naive and extreme receivers, and it is also strictly optimal against moderate receivers by Part 4 of Assumption COM. Hence, Part 2 of Assumption COM ensures that regardless of what moderate senders do when = 1, it is strictly optimal for moderate receivers to play a = 0 afters = 0. Thus moderate receivers must play a = 0 with probability 1 afters = 0.
Step 5: In any equilibrium, moderate senders send s = 0 when
t < 1, and send s = 1 when = 1 if the opposite inequality holds. This follows from the characterization of the moderate receiver's strategy, single-crossing (which implies that sending s = 0 is always preferable to sending s = 1), and the derivation of this inequality in the existence part of the proof.
Before presenting the proof of Proposition 6, we state and prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In the political partisanship model, let t be moderate player t's assessment of the probability that the opposing group is extremist, conditional on player t 1 failing to communicate and player t's group holding power in period t. Then lim t!1 t = 0 , and lim !0 1 = 1.
Proof. We work up to computing t by …rst computing three other probabilities, which will be denoted by t , t , and t . Let t be the probability that whichever group is in power today is also in power t periods from now, when the probability that power switches each period is . Note that this event is equivalent to power switching an even number of times out of t chances. Thus, it is straightforward to check that
In addition, it can easily be shown that if = 1 2 (contrary to our assumptions) then t = 1 2 . Next, let t be the probability that the left-wing group (say) is in power in period t and does not observe communication, conditional on the event that the left-wing group is moderate and the right-wing group is extremist. By Bayes rule,
This expression requires some explanation. The …rst term corresponds to the event that the left-wing group is in power in period 0. This event is then divided into the events that the …rst time m at which a player sets s m = 0 is m = 1; : : : ; t. Conditional on the left-wing group holding power in period 0, the probability that m = t, the left-wing group holds power in period t, and player t 1 does not successfully communicate is 1 2 t (1 ) t 1 . And for any m < t, conditional on the left-wing group holding power in period 0, the probability that the …rst time at which a player sets s = 0 is m, the left-wing group holds power in period t, and player t 1 does not successfully communicate
t m , as after m 1 periods of the left-wing group holding power and setting s = 1, there is probability 1 2 that the (extremist) right-wing group takes power, and probability 1 2 that the left-wing group retains power but starts setting s = 0 (and in either event all subsequent power switches occur with probability ). Finally, the 1 2 (1 t ) term corresponds to the possibility that the right-wing group is in power in period 0.
Finally, let t be the probability that the left-wing group is in power in period t and does not observe communication, conditional on the event that the left-wing group is moderate and the rightwing group is moderate. By Bayes rule,
This formula is similar but somewhat simpler than the formula for t . The …rst term corresponds to the event that there are t 1 successfully communications. For each term in the sum, the probability that the …rst time at which a player sets s = 0 is m, the left-wing group holds power in period t, and player t 1 does not successfully communicate is (1 ) , and both groups subsequently set s = 0 (so subsequent power switches occur with probability ).
The assessment of moderate player t of the probability that the opposing group is extremist, conditional on player t 1 not successfully communicating (and conditional on player t's group holding power in period t) is now simply Proof of Proposition 6. Fix a time t < T P OL , where T P OL is to be computed. We …rst derive the turnout decisions of the supporters of the incumbent party. When they see communication about , they infer that their own party is moderate, so their net bene…t from turning out is
where the …rst term is the change in probability of the same party keeping power because of the greater turnout, the second term, , is the belief after receiving informative communication that the other side is an extremist, and the last term is the net gain from having their own party rather than an extremist opposing party in power, taking into account that moderates on both sides will choose the right policy on the major issue. Under the hypothesized behavior of politicians, is determined by Bayes rule and satis…es 0 . Intuitively, this is because both the information that the period t base's party is in power and the information that the period t leader successfully communicates suggest that the opposing party is more likely to be moderate. To see this formally, note that if the opposing party is extremist, then the only way that the period t base's party holds power in period t and the period t leader successfully communicates is if the period t base's party holds power and successfully communicates in periods 0; : : : ; t, which occurs with probability Finally, the fact that 0 combined with the assumption that c > (1 + ) , so the incumbent's base never turns out following successful communication.
Next consider the behavior of the incumbent's base following propaganda. Since every politician acts on the partisan issue following propaganda, the net bene…t from turning out in this case can be written as 2 1 2 .
The assumption that c < 2 1 2 now implies that the incumbent's base always turns out following propaganda.
We now turn to moderate politicians' incentives. First, consider the payo¤ from playing s t = 0.
Given the above assumptions, this ensures turnout but will also cause the next leader to act on that partisan issue. When the belief that the other side is extremist is , this has payo¤
(1 ) (1) (1 + 2 ) :
On the other hand, playing s t = 1 yields payo¤ The di¤erence between these payo¤s equals However, the assumption that < < 0. Thus, extremist politicians never attempt communication.
Now to compute T P OL , note that Lemma 2 and the assumption that 0 < P OL imply that there exists a smallest integer t such that t P OL . Denoting this integer by T P OL and following the same argument as in the baseline model now implies that the conjectured strategy pro…le (and beliefs) is a sequential equilibrium, with cycle length T P OL . 35 Finally, this sequential equilibrium is unique-up to indi¤erence at non-generic parameter valuesby the same argument as in the baseline model, with the addition that the beliefs and strategies of the base are also uniquely determined by induction on t. In particular, the t = 0 base does not turn out after observing communication (as its assessment that the opposing party is extreme must be 0 , regardless of whether or not it observes communication, in any sequential equilibrium), and the t = 0 base does turn out after observing propaganda (regardless of its assessment that the opposing party is extreme). The rest of the induction argument proceeds exactly as in the baseline model (or as in the proof of Proposition 4, where more details are provided).
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that t <T , whereT is the cycle length when both bases can turn out, which remains to be computed. When the out-of-power base turns out, it increases the probability that its party holds power in period t + 1 by 1 2 (note that this is true even if the in-power base also turns out, as in that case turning out increases the probability of a power switch from G ( k) = to 1 2 ). If player t successfully communicated and both parties are moderate, then the 3 5 In addition, the fact that lim !0 1 = 1 implies that T > 1 when is su¢ ciently small. bene…t to the out-of-power base of having its own party in power in period t + 1 (compared to having the other party in power) is 0. If player t successfully communicated and only the opposing party is moderate, then this bene…t is 1 + (so that in this case the out-of-power base would rather its party lose the election). If player t did not successfully communicate, then the bene…t is 2 . Finally, the event that player t successfully communicated and only the out-of-power party is moderate occurs with probability 0. We now claim that the net bene…t to the out-of-power period t base of turning out (for t <T ) is
To see this, note that the probability that player t successfully communicated and both parties are moderate, conditional on the out-of-power base's party being out of power, is (1 0 ) 2 (1 ) t ; the probability that player t successfully communicated and only the opposing party is moderate, conditional on the out-of-power base's party being out of power, is 0 (1 0 )
and, since the probability that player t successfully communicated and only the out-of-power base's party is moderate is 0, the probability that player t did not successfully communicate is
Note that N B t is increasing in t, and that lim t!1 N B t = 1 2
(2 ). Hence, the assumption that c < (2 ) implies that there is some timeT such that the out-of-power base turns out if and only ifT <T and t T modT . Now observe that ifT T P OL (de…ned in the proof of Proposition 6), then t is as in Proposition 6, which implies thatT = T P OL and the out-of-power base never turns out. If insteadT < T P OL then the computation of t in the proof of Proposition 6 must be modi…ed to take into account that the probability of a power switch changes deterministically at timeT (from 1 2 to 1 if the in-power base does not turn out, and from to 1 2 if the in-power base does turn out). Without explicitly calculatingT in this case, it is easy to see that ifT < T P OL then alsoT <T , as ifT T then the formula forT would be the same as for T , contradictingT < T P OL .
Thus, ifT < T P OL , then there is a deterministic timeT >T such that partisan phases always begin with probability and end deterministically at times t = 0 modT , the in-power base turns out only during partisan phases, and the out-of-power base turns out for the lastT T periods of everyT period cycle (regardless of whether the partisan phase has begun or not).
Proof of Proposition 8.
Since player t + 1 plays x t+1 = 1 if and only if he is normal and y t = 1, it follows that (normal) player t plays y t = 1 if and only if his belief that the other group is bad is below the cuto¤ 2 SIDED . Now one can compute that M t by adopting the proof of Lemma 1). In particular, M t (1;1) > 0 for all t, and hence 0 t < 0 for all t. Therefore, Assumption 2 00 implies that player t always plays y t = 1 after seeing signalỹ t 1 = 1. Finally, t > 2 SIDED for all t < T 2 SIDED (with the convention that T 2 SIDED = 1 if 1 2 SIDED ), by de…nition of T 2 SIDED , so player t plays y t = 0 after seeingỹ t 1 = 1, for all t < T 2 SIDED . That player t plays y t = 0 after seeingỹ t 1 = 1 for all t 6 = 0 mod T 2 SIDED can now be established by induction, as in the baseline model.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that normal players choose y t = 1 if and only ifỹ t 1 = 1 or player t 1 is crazy. Now if both groups are normal, then non-crazy player t plays y t = 0 if and only if the most recent "misheard signal" (i.e., time t 0 such that y t 0 = 1 butỹ t 0 = 0) came after the most recent arrival of a crazy player. Then denote the probability of this happening in period t by t . Then one can check that
where the …rm term sums over times at which the most recent arrival of a crazy player could have occurred, and the second term accounts for the possibility that there might not have been any crazy players by time t 0 . Summing the geometric series yields
Now, by Bayes rule,
Note that t is decreasing in t because t is increasing in t. Moreover, from (2), Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose not. Then there exists a time T such that at all times t T normal player t plays y t = 0 after observing all bad signals. Suppose that both groups are normal, and observe that the probability that player T + K observes all bad signals is at least K . In this event, all subsequent players play y t = 0 and thus observe all bad signals. In the alternative event that player T + K observes at least one good signal, the probability that player T + 2K observes all bad signals is still at least K . Hence, the overall probability that player T + 2K observes all bad signals is at least 1 1 K 2 . Now it is easy to see by induction on m that player T + mK observes all bad signals with probability at least 1 1 K m . Hence, normal player T + mK's belief that the other group is bad when she observes all bad signals is at most
This belief converges to 0 as m ! 1, so it follows from Assumption 2 that~ T +M K < for some integer M . Assumption 2 now implies that normal player T + M K would deviate to playing y T +M K = 1 after observing all bad signals, which yields a contradiction and establishes the desired result.
